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INTRAFAMILY TORT IMMUNITY IN VIRGINIA:
A DOCTRINE IN DECLINE
Tort actions by one family member against another have not
always been allowed by courts in the United States. Initial recogni-
tion of interspousal and parental immunity from suit was based on
traditional concepts of family relations reflected in the common law.
As the passage of time altered the popular view of these family
relations, the common law bases for the immunities lost credibility.
The immunities doctrine itself, however, retained vitality, with
public policy considerations supplanting the traditional common
law rationales.
Through the years, legislative and judicial action modified the
family immunities doctrine such that tort actions between family
members are permitted now in most instances. The extent to which
particular jurisdictions are willing to entertain such suits varies.
This Note will explore the history of interspousal and parental im-
munities in Virginia, the present status of those immunities doc-
trines, and the relation of the Virginia position on the doctrine to
that of other states. Finally, this Note will offer recommendations
for a strictly limited application of family immunity in Virginia and
propose methods for dealing with the consequences of almost total
abrogation of the doctrine.
INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY
The Common Law Background
At common law, the husband and wife were considered one;' their
separate identities merged upon marriage. This legal identity of
husband and wife presented both a substantive and a procedural
bar to suits between the two. The wife was considered incapable of
suing or being sued in her own name;2 therefore, the law required
that the husband be joined with her in any suit at law. Thus, in
any action between husband and wife, a suit would be procedurally
untenable because the husband would have to be both plaintiff and
1. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 442. "At common law husband and wife were, for the
most part, regarded as one, and that one was the husband." Keister's Adm'r. v. Keister's
Ex'rs., 123 Va. 157, 176, 96 S.E. 315, 321 (1918) (Burks, J., concurring).
2. See Bishop v. Readsboro Chair Mfg. Co., 85 Vt. 141, 81 A. 454 (1911).
3. For a discussion of the married woman's separate estate in equity, see McCurdy, Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. Rav. 1030, 1035-36 (1930),
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defendant.' Similarly, because one cannot assert a cause of action
against himself in either tort or contract, the view of husband and
wife as a single entity formed a substantive bar to suit during cover-
ture.5
The exact origin of common law immunity between husband and
wife is uncertain, but several sources have been credited with influ-
encing the development of the doctrine. The Bible, the belief in the
position of the pater-families in Roman law, the natural law concep-
tion of the husband as head of the family, and the traditions of
feudalism, all played a role in developing the common law view of
the husband's subsuming the wife's identity in the marital relation.'
Whatever its source, the doctrine of interspousal immunity became
firmly embedded in the common law, 7 and remained unchallenged
in the United States until the age of the emancipation of women.
Indeed, the common law traditions presented a formidable obstacle
to the struggle to expand the rights of married women.8 Slowly,
however, those traditions began to give way.
The Married Woman's Property Acts
In the mid-nineteenth century, state legislatures began to remedy
the disabilities of married women.9 The Married Woman's Property
Acts were designed primarily to secure to a married woman a sepa-
rate legal identity and a separate legal estate in her own property.'
Few of these statutes expressly dealt with the question of one
spouse's ability or right to sue another; therefore, the early attacks
on interspousal immunity focused on statutory interpretation."
Despite the opportunity to construe the statutes as permitting ac-
4. See Jewell v. Porter & Rolfe, 31 N.H. 34, 38 (1855).
5. See Bassett v. Bassett, 112 Mass. 99, 100 (1873).
6. McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1035.
7. See Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876) (holding that no action could be brought after
divorce by a former wife against her former husband for alleged assaults and batteries com-
mitted during coverture).
8. For a detailed study of the disabilities affecting married women at common law, see
McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1031-35.
9. England passed its first Married Woman's Property Act in 1870. See McCurdy, Personal
Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303, 307-08 (1959).
10. For a collection of the statutes of the various jurisdictions, see 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMILY LAWS §§ 167, 179, 180 (1935). For a classification of the various types of statutes, and
their effects on procedure and available remedies, see McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1037.
11. See 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 550, 553 (1966).
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tions by a wife against her husband, the early cases demonstrated
an inclination to defer to the wisdom of the common law and to deny
such actions. 12 Consequently, the Married Woman's Property Acts,
although freeing married women from the disabilities of the com-
mon law in many areas, did little to hasten the demise of the doc-
trine of interspousal immunity for personal torts.13
In 1910, the United States Supreme Court addressed the scope of
the emancipation acts in Thompson v. Thompson. 14 Called upon to
interpret the Married Woman's Act of the District of Columbia,,
the Court stated that "[t]he statute was not intended to give a
right of action as against the husband, but to allow the wife, in her
own name, to maintain actions of tort which at common law must
be brought in the joint names of herself and her husband."' 6 Thus,
the wife could not bring an action against her husband for injuries
sustained from an assault and battery. The Court grounded its deci-
sion on such policy factors as the danger of false accusations by one
spouse against the other, the undesirability of public notice of do-
mestic quarrels, and the necessity of deferring to legislative intent.,7
In addition, the Court noted that the wife had adequate remedies
in the criminal and divorce courts. 8 The Court's respect for tradi-
tion and its appreciation of the likely impact of permitting the
action were implicit in the statement that "such radical and far-
12. See, e.g., Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); Lillienkamp v.
Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.W. 628 (1915). Despite the unavailability of an action for a
tort against the person, the courts generally held that these Emancipation Acts enabled a
married woman to maintain an action against her husband for any tort against her property
interests. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Carpenter, 154 Mich. 100, 117 N.W. 598 (1908); Good v.
Good, 39 W. Va. 357, 19 S.E. 382 (1894). Thus, the main effect of these statutes was to give
the married woman the right to her separate estate. This separate estate, however, was
generally held not to include choses in action against the husband.
13. Arguably the early Married Woman's Property Acts retarded the abrogation of the
immunity. When the conservative, traditional philosophy of the early courts construing these
statutes was given approval by the operation of stare decisis those judicial pronouncements
fostered resistance to change. By refusing to construe these statutes as permitting inter-
spousal suits, the early cases established precedents which would aid in continued application
of the interspousal immunity doctrine.
14. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
15. For the content of the District of Columbia statute, see id. at 615-16.
16. Id. at 617.
17. Id. at 617-18. "But these and kindred considerations are addressed to the legislative,
not the judicial branch of the Government. In cases like the present, interpretation of the
law is the only function of the courts." Id. at 618.
18. Id. at 619.
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reaching changes should only be wrought by language so clear and
plain as to be unmistakable evidence of the legislative intention.""'
The construction of the statute in Thompson and the rationale upon
which the decision was based were to become cited frequently as
precedent for the denial of similar actions.
The ringing dissent of Justice Harlan in Thompson is notewor-
thy.2 Harlan felt that the statute destroyed "the unity of the mar-
riage association as it had previously existed" 2' and that the hus-
band no longer should be exempted from liability for torts against
his wife. In addition, Harlan underscored the contradiction inherent
in allowing suits between spouses based on torts against property,
but denying such actions when the tort was against the person.22
Harlan's dissent, in which Justices Holmes and Hughes joined, has
become the foundation for arguments of courts and commentators
advocating the abrogation of interspousal immunity for personal
torts.?
Public Policy Supplants Common Law Traditional Grounds for
Interspousal Immunity
Although the Married Woman's Property Acts presented the first
challenges to the tort defense of interspousal immunity, the passage
of time further eroded the legal fiction of marital identity upon
which the doctrine had been grounded. As equality between men
and women became a concern of the law, the legal identity of hus-
band and wife became a less satisfactory rationale for denying ac-
tions between spouses. Accordingly, the courts found new justifica-
tions for adhering to an old rule.
Public policy became the rallying ground for supporters of the
rule of interspousal immunity.24 Among the policy arguments used
19. Id. at 618. This is an expression of the traditional view that statutes in derogation of
the common law should be construed strictly; however, the court in Thompson ignored the
equally familiar maxim that remedial statutes should be liberally construed.
20. Id. at 619 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 622 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22. "I cannot believe that [Congress] intended to permit the wife to sue the husband
separately, in tort, for the recovery . . . of her property, and at the same time deny her the
right to sue him, separately, for a tort committed against her person." Id. at 623 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
23. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971).
24. See, e.g., Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950); Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187,
179 S.E. 604 (1935). But see Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 550, 180 A.2d 772, 774 (1962)
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to support interspousal immunity were the fear of collusive suits
against insurers, the danger of the destruction of domestic tranquil-
ity, the existence of adequate remedies in the divorce and criminal
laws, and the judicial reluctance to encourage actions born of trivial
marital disputes.21 Stare decisis and the desirability of deferring
decisions in derogation of the common law to the legislature were
additional bases for judicial resistance to abrogating the immunities
doctrine. 6 Relying on these policy arguments, the majority of juris-
dictions continued to recognize interspousal immunity despite the
decline of the legal fiction of marital identity. 7
Virginia's Position on Interspousal Immunity
The Supreme Court of Virginia was an early adherent to the com-
mon law rule that a married woman could not contract with her
husband 2l and that neither spouse could sue the other at law. Vir-
ginia thus aligned itself with the majority of jurisdictions 3 uphold-
ing the immunity on the basis of the legal fiction of marital ident-
ity.3' Similarly, like most other states, Virginia reacted to the chang-
ing status of the American woman in the late nineteenth century by
enacting a Married Woman's Act.32 Predictably, however, the Vir-
(Musmanno, J., dissenting). Alluding to denial of interspousal actions in which the defendant
has liability insurance, Judge Musmanno stated: "I believe that there is really something
against public policy in a doctrine which holds that the head of a family may protect the
whole world against his negligence except those he loves most and are wholly dependent upon
him for maintenance and substance." Id. at 550, 180 A.2d at 781 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
25. See 10 WILLAMmrrE L.J. 287 (1974).
26. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618 (1910).
27. For early criticism of the immunity doctrine, see McCurdy, supra note 9; Sanford,
Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 V~AD. L. Rav. 823 (1956).
28. Catlett v. Alsop, Mosby & Co., 99 Va. 680, 40 S.E. 34 (1901); Griffin v. Birkhead, 84
Va. 612, 5 S.E. 685 (1888).
29. Payne v. Coles, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 373 (1810). But see De Baun's Ex'r. v. De Baun, 119
Va. 85, 89 S.E. 239 (1916) (noting that a married woman always was able to sue her husband
in a court of equity).
30. 'For a collection of cases following the majority rule, see Comment, Tort Actions Be-
tween Members of the Family-Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. Ray. 152, 156
n.24 (1961).
31. "At common law husband and wife were, for the most part, regarded as one, and that
one was the husband." Keister's Adm'r. v. Keister's Ex'rs., 123 Va. 157, 176, 96 S.E. 315,
321 (1918) (Burks, J., concurring).
32. 1876-77 Va. Acts, ch. 329. The current vdrsion of the Married Woman's Act in Virginia
is at VA. CODE §§ 55-35 to 37. VA. CoDE § 55-35 reads in pertinent part:
A married woman shall have the right to acquire, hold, use, control and dispose
of property as if she were unmarried. . . . But neither her husband's right to
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ginia Supreme Court's construction of this statute fell far short of
total abrogation of interspousal immunity. 3 Early decisions
construing the Virginia Married Woman's Act held that the effect
of the act was to allow the wife to hold property and to contract
regarding that property, 34 but not to permit the wife to sue her
husband for personal torts.35
The first case squarely testing the effect of Virginia's Married
Woman's Act on personal tort actions between spouses was Keister's
Administrator v. Keister's Executors.36 Keister remains the bench-
mark decision for advocates of interspousal immunity in Virginia.
In Keister, a wrongful death action was brought by the wife's ad-
ministrator against the executors of the husband's estate. In decid-
ing whether a wrongful death action was available, the court looked
to the Married Woman's Act 7 to determine whether the wife could
have brought the action against her husband had she survived. The
sole issue was whether the Married Woman's Act abrogated the
common law rule of immunity with respect to personal torts.
curtesy nor his marital rights shall entitle him to the possession or use, or to
the rents, issues and profits, of such real estate during the coverture; nor shall
the property of the wife be subject to the debts or liabilities of the husband.
VA. CODE § 55-35. VA. CODE § 55-36 provides in peritinent part: "A married woman may
contract and be contracted with and sue and be sued in the same manner and with the same
consequences as if she were unmarried. ... ." VA. CODE § 55-37 provides: "A husband shall
not be responsible for any contract, liability or tort of his wife, whether the contract or
liability was incurred or the tort was committed before or after marriage."
33. See text accompanying notes 12 & 13 supra.
34. "But when once this idea of legal unity has been so far severed that she may contract
and be contracted with, as under this married woman's act she clearly may, we can perceive
no valid reason why she may not as well sue her husband as another at law upon any contract
made with him after the passage of the act." Alexander v. Alexander, 85 Va. 353, 366, 7 S.E.
335, 340 (1888) (citations omitted). See also Edmonds v. Edmonds, 139 Va. 652, 124 S.E. 415
(1924) (allowing a wife's action for unlawful detainer); Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Dougherty, 92
Va. 372, 23 S.E. 777 (1895) (dismissing suit on basis that the husband was not a proper party
because the wife's estate is separate by reason of the Married Woman's Act). But see Hirth
v. Hirth, 98 Va. 121, 34 S.E 964 (1900) (holding that a married woman is, as at common law,
incapable of making a contract unless she owns a separate estate at the time the contract is
made).
35. Keister's Adm'r. v. Keister's Ex'rs., 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918) (denying an inter-
spousal action for assault).
36. Id.
37. POLLARD'S CODE OF VIRGINIA § 2286a (1899-1900). The statute is very similar to the
modern version. See note 32 supra.
38. The Legislature is presumed to have known and to have had the common
law in mind in the enactment of the statute; and the statute will be construed
to read as if the common law remained unchanged . . . unless the purpose of
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Applying traditional rules of statutory construction, the court con-
cluded that the statute had not conferred such a right of action upon
the wife either expressly or by necessary implication. Rejecting the
contention that a cause of action was created impliedly, the court
found that if the legislature had intended to effect such a drastic
change ii the law, it would have expressed such an intent in the
statute." The court noted that the legislature intended "merely to
enlarge the remedies of married women with respect to other sub-
stantive rights of theirs existing at common law,",40 but that no right
or cause of action was created where none had existed previously.
Finding the Virginia Married Woman's Act entirely consistent with
the common law,4.' the court left undisturbed the common law disa-
bility of one spouse to sue another.4"
In a concurring opinion in Keister, Justice Burks voiced many of
the traditional concerns of the judiciary regarding the sanctity of
marriage.43  He stated that "[u]pon the preservation of
[marriage's] integrity the health, morals and purity of the state is
dependent."" Justice Burks also maintained that the obligations of
marriage "forbid the idea that this 'one flesh' may so divide itself
that either spouse may sue the other. 5 Expressing some of the
policy reasons supporting immunity, such as the danger of opening
the courts to the public airing of domestic differences and the exist-
ence of sufficient safeguards in the criminal and divorce courts,4
Justice Burks joined the majority of the court in refusing to expand
the statute to change the common law appears from the express language of it
or by necessary implication from such language.
123 Va. at 162, 96 S.E. at 317.
39. Id. at 173, 96 S.E. at 321.
40. Id. at 163, 96 S.E. at 317.
41. Id. at 170, 96 S.E. at 318.
42. The court in Keister followed the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in the case
of Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909). In Peters, the wife maintained that her
right to sue her husband in tort was her property and that the California Married Woman's
Act, very similar to Virginia's act, gave married women complete property rights. The court
concluded, however, that this argument merely begged the question, because the wife would
have property only if the right to sue was held to exist.
Also, to hold that the Married Woman's Act gave the wife the right to sue her husband in
tort would create a problem because no corresponding legislation gave the husband the same
right.
43. 123 Va. at 176, 96 S.E. at 321 (Burks, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 176, 96 S.E. at 322 (Burks, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 177, 96 S.E. at 322 (Burks, J., concurring).
46. Id.
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the plain meaning of the statute. 7
The doctrine of interspousal immunity in Virginia received addi-
tional support in Floyd v. Miller.48 Floyd presented the issue of
whether a husband could collect money from a damage recovery
fund held by a committee for his mentally defective wife for expen-
ses incurred by the husband for hospital and medical attention for
his wife. Strictly adhering to the common law view of marital ident-
ity and the narrow construction of the Married Woman's Act in
Keister, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the husband could
not bring such an action against his wife. The court combined the
common law rule that hospital and medical services were necessities
for which the husband was liable and the portion of the Married
Woman's Act which provided that a married woman's property
should not be available to pay the debts of her husband." The court
held that the latest amendment to Virginia's Married Woman's Act
was "wholly devoid of implication or suggestion that any part of the
damages recoverable by the wife is to be held by her for her hus-
band's benefit, nor is any substantive right to maintain an action
against his wife therefor created therein for the husband through
implication or otherwise."5
The next significant challenge to interspousal tort immunity in
Virginia came in 1952 in Furey v. Furey.5 In Furey, a wife brought
an action against her husband for injuries sustained in an automo-
bile accident occurring before their marriage. Refusing to create an
exception for torts committed before marriage, the court held that
"the rule of the common law [was] that all liability for antenuptial
torts is extinguished by marriage. 5 2 The court added that the same
factors which prohibited a husband and wife from suing each other
for torts occurring during marriage applied to torts committed be-
fore marriage.5 3 In so stating, the Supreme Court of Virginia ex-
47. "[T]o warrant a holding that either spouse may sue the other for slander, libel or
assault, the language of the statue should be so plain that there could be no room for differ-
ence of opinion on the subject." Id.
48. 190 Va. 303, 57 S.E.2d 114 (1950).
49. Id. at 306, 57 S.E.2d at 115. The harshness of this decision is evidenced by the prompt
action of the General Assembly in overturning the result. 1950 Va. Acts, ch. 281. The statute
now allows expenses incurred from the wife's injuries to be chargeable against any judgment
she recovers.
50. 190 Va. at 309, 57 S.E.2d at 117.
51. 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952).
52. Id. at 730, 71 S.E.2d at 192.
53. Id. at 733, 71 S.E.2d at 194-95.
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tended its decision in Keister to torts committed before the mar-
riage, justifying the upholding of immunity with a blend of common
law fictions and public policy factors.
Long-Recognized Exceptions to Interspousal Immunity in Virginia
Despite the support for the immunity doctrine in Furey and pre-
vious cases, courts in Virginih uniformly recognized the right of one
spouse to sue the other in particular fact situations. For example, a
wife could recover death benefits as a partial dependent of her de-
ceased son despite the fact that the son's employer was her hus-
band." The courts also recognized the right of husband and wife to
enter into an enforceable contract,55 and to sue each other for torts
against property.
In Virginia, the keynote case allowing interspousal suits for torts
against property is Vigilant Insurance Co. v. Bennett.51 In that case,
the sole issue was whether an insurance company, as subrogee of the
husband's rights, could maintain an action against the policy
holder's wife. Although the court followed precedent by allowing the
action to lie,5 the decision supplied a careful analysis of the com-
mon law principles supporting interspousal immunity and the effect
of the Married Woman's Act on these principles. The court listed
54. Glassco v. Glassco, 195 Va. 239, 77 S.E.2d 843 (1953). The court emphasized, however,
that this was not really an abrogation of the immunity because such an action was "not one
to recover damage for a wrong, for the employer's liability is not based upon tort." Id. at 241,
77 S.E.2d at 844 (citations omitted). The court simply held that the Virginia Workmen's
Compensation Act makes no exception based on a family relationship between employer and
employee. Id. at 245, 77 S.E.2d at 846.
55. Klotz v. Klotz, 202 Va. 393, 400, 117 S.E.2d 650, 655 (1961); Harlan v. Weatherly, 183
Va. 49, 31 S.E.2d 263 (1944).
56. Edmonds v. Edmonds, 139 Va. 652, 124 S.E. 415 (1924). The court stated that the
Virginia Married Woman's Act "has gone as far as the statute of any other state with respect
to the rights of married women." Id. at 657, 124 S.E. at 416. This contention seems doubtful,
however, because some states construed their Emancipation Acts as creating a cause of action
between the husband and wife for personal torts. See, e.g., Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516,
105 S.E. 206 (1920) (action against husband for infecting his wife with venereal disease);
Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1920) (action for willful tort). Although some of
the variation among jurisdictions can be explained by the application of different statutes,
the Virginia Supreme Court could have construed the Virginia Married Woman's Act as
allowing actions for personal torts between spouses.
57. 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955). In Vigilant, the insurance company, as subrogee under
an automobile fire policy, paid the amount due under the policy and sued the policy holder's
wife for destruction of the automobile. The insurer's only rights were those that the husband
had against his wife. For a Comment on Vigilant, see 42 VA. L. Rnv. 119 (1956).
58. See note 56 supra & accompanying text.
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three reasons to explain why a wife could not sue her husband at
common law: her identity was merged with her husband's; she was
non sui juris; and damages for a tortious wrong committed against
her constituted a chose in action which the husband was entitled to
reduce to possession during coverture. 5 The court held that the
Virginia Married Woman's Act had abrogated the common law in
respect to torts against property, but not as to personal torts,"1' add-
ing in dictum that even at common law the identity was one of
personality but not property." In addition to listing the reasons
supporting the wife's disability to sue her husband at common law, 2
the court in Vigilant noted three reasons to explain why the husband
could not sue his wife in tort: legal identity was created by marriage;
the wife was rendered non sui juris; and the husband was liable for
the torts of his wife.63 Thus, in any suit between husband and wife,
the husband would be both plaintiff and defendant. The essence of
the holding in Vigilant, therefore, was that "the development of
legislation over the years has. . . wholly abolished all marital unity
affecting property interest and has given to and imposed upon the
spouses full rights and liabilities incident to their property." 4
The case analysis thus far demonstrates that interspousal im-
munity in Virginia was a complex blend of procedural and substan-
tive barriers grounded in common law fictions and public policy
factors. Against this background, the Supreme Court of Virginia, as
had many other states, began to modify its disdain for the common
law rule of interspousal immunity.
Present Status of Interspousal Immunity in Virginia
In Surratt v. Thompson,65 the Supreme Court of Virginia took a
59. 197 Va. at 218, 89 S.E.2d at 71 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 223, 89 S.E.2d at 74.
61. Id.
62. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
63. 197 Va. at 218, 89 S.E.2d at 71.
64. Id. at 226, 89 S.E.2d at 76.
65. 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971). In Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d
190 (1971), decided on the same day as Surratt, the Virginia Supreme Court also abrogated
parental immunity in automobile accident litigation. For an analysis of the effects of Surratt
and Kauffman on insurance in Virginia, see 22 CATH. U.L. REv. 167 (1972). For other recent
decisions abrogating interspousal immunity, see Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d
951 (1978); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, - W. Va. -, 244 S.E.2d 338 (1978); Bounds v.
Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977) (abrogating the immunity for willful and intentional
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major step toward joining the growing number of jurisdictions that
have abrogated interspousal tort immunity. In Surratt, the admin-
istrator of a deceased woman's estate brought a wrongful death
action against her husband. The court held that a wife could main-
tain an action against her husband for personal injuries sustained
in an automobile accident, and thus an administrator of a deceased
woman's estate could maintain a wrongful death action against the
decedent's husband. Significantly, the court determined that Vir-
ginia's wrongful death statute"6 did not afford the personal repre-
sentative of a deceased wife a right of action unless the right existed
immediately before her death. 7 By so construing the wrongful death
statute, the court was forced to determine the validity of the com-
mon law immunity.
The court in Surratt stated that Smith v. Kauffman, 8 a contem-
poraneous Virginia case abrogating parental immunity in automo-
bile accident litigation, had disposed of all the policy factors sup-
porting family immunities in automobile negligence actions. The
court dismissed the arguments for the doctrine which had been
based on the prevention of fraud and collusion, the preservation of
domestic harmony, and the preservation of family finances." Thus,
the common law disability to sue for personal torts remained the
sole justification for applying interspousal immunity. In permitting
the action, the court refused to employ a strained construction of
Virginia's Married Woman's Act 70 and instead took the more direct
approach of modifying the common law.7 1 The court noted that
"former rules should give way to rules of reason in the light of
changed circumstances." 7 For support, the court cited a recently
decided New Jersey case abrogating interspousal tort immunity in
the area of automobile accident litigation.73 Emphasizing that the
torts). But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Leary, 168 Mont. 482, 544 P.2d 444 (1975)
(upholding a family exclusion clause in an automobile insurance contract as not against
public policy).
66. VA. CODE § 8-633 (1957) (currently codified at VA. CODE § 8.01-51 et seq.).
67. 212 Va. at 193, 183 S.E.2d at 201, citing Street v. Consumers Mining Corp.,, 185 Va.
561, 39 S.E.2d 271 (1946).
68. 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971). See note 65 supra.
69. Id. at 192, 183 S.E.2d at 201.
70. See note 42 supra.
71. See 6 U. RiCH. L. REv. 379 (1971-72).
72. 212 Va. at 193, 183 S.E.2d at 202, citing Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 20, 4 S.E.2d
343, 346-47 (1939).
73. Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 488, 267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970).
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common law must recognize changing needs and conditions in order
to avoid becoming "an instrument of injustice," 74 the court observed
that "the metaphysical concept that husband and wife are one flesh,
as the sole barrier to interspousal actions for injuries incurred in
automobile accidents, 'cannot be seriously defended today.' -7' The
court concluded that "today's high incidence of insurance covering
automobile accidents" was a condition that warranted a change in
the common law.7 Thus, in Surratt, the Virginia Supreme Court
took a giant step toward abolishing the interspousal immunities
doctrine despite its refusal to "decide whether a wife can maintain
an action against her husband for personal injuries that do not
result from a motor vehicle accident. ' 77
In Korman v. Carpenter,7 four years after Surratt, the Virginia
Supreme Court had the opportunity to eliminate the interspousal
immunity doctrine entirely. In Korman, the defendant had shot and
killed his wife. At the time of the homicide, the husband and wife
were living apart and had executed a separation and property settle-
ment agreement. On behalf of decedent's parents and brothers, the
administrator of decedent's estate brought a wrongful death action
against the husband's committee. Defendant's demurrer, which the
trial court had sustained relying on Keister,71 was based on the
theory that no action could be maintained under Virginia's wrongful
death act because the decedent would not have been able to sue her
husband for assault had she lived.80 The trial court gave the Virginia
74. "The nature of the common law requires that each time a rule of law is applied it be
carefully scrutinized to make sure that the conditions and needs of the times have not so
changed as to make further application of it the instrument of injustice." 212 Va. at 193, 183
S.E.2d at 202, quoting State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505, 129 A.2d 715, 721 (1957).
75. 212 Va. at 193-94, 183 S.E.2d at 202, quoting Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 488, 267
A.2d 481, 484 (1970).
76. 212 Va. at 194, 183 S.E.2d at 202.
77. Id. Two years after Surratt, the court held that this abrogation of interspousal immun-
ity would not be given retroactive effect. Fountain v. Fountain, 214 Va. 347, 200 S.E.2d 513
(1973). The court cited as the basis for its decision the justifiable reliance by insurance
carriers on earlier decisions. In so holding, the court followed the modern rule of allowing only
prospective effect to decisions abrogating the common law. See generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d
1371 (1966). See also Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling,
51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965).
78. 216 Va. 86, 216 S.E.2d 195 (1975).
79. Id. at 87, 216 S.E.2d at 195.
80. See 10 U. RiCH. L. REV. 434 (1976). The student commentator suggests that the Virginia
Supreme Court failed to distinguish between wrongful death statutes and survival statutes.
Virginia has a wrongful death statute; therefore, the rights of the beneficiaries are indepen-
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Married Woman's Act its traditional interpretation and denied such
a right of action. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
allowed the action to be maintained, reiterating, however, that au-
tomobile accident litigation was the sole exception to interspousal
immunity and that the legislature had not broadened this excep-
tion.
In reaching its decision in Korman, the court noted that "[t]he
reason for interspousal immunity is to foster a harmonious and con-
jugal relationship. Obviously the reason for the rule is lost upon the
death of one of the parties for there is no longer a marriage to be
saved or a union to be preserved." 8' Carefully limiting the holding
to the facts of the case, the Virginia Supreme Court thus carved out
another narrow exception to the rule of interspousal immunity.
Korman should be read as permitting an action only when the tor-
tious act "results in the termination of the marriage by death, and
when the deceased spouse is survived by no living child or grand-
child."8 The court was "not persuaded that permitting a living
spouse to sue for torts committed by one on the other, except in
automobile accident litigation, would do otherwise than contribute
to the destruction of their marriage, '8 3 and thereby resisted com-
plete abrogation of the interspousal immunity doctrine.
The decisions in Surratt and Korman paved the way for inter-
spousal suits in Virginia in automobile negligence cases and in in-
stances in which there is no threat to marital harmony. Unless such
circumstances exist, actions between spouses usually will not be
permitted. The rule is not inflexible, however, and Virginia courts
have demonstrated a willingness to abrogate interspousal immunity
on a limited case-by-case basis. The common law identity of hus-
band and wife is no longer a barrier to suit;84 therefore, the sole
dent of the rights of the decedents and are thus untouched by the doctrine of interspousal
tort immunity.
81. 216 Va. at 90, 216 S.E.2d at 198.
82. Id. at 91-92, 216 S.E.2d at 198. The court, however, did express concern with the effects
of permitting a recovery from a surviving parent responsible for the support of those persons
for whose benefit recovery is had, on family harmony.
83. 216 Va. at 92, 216 S.E.2d at 198. For an analysis of Korman, see 10 U. RICH. L. REV.
434 (1976), which observes that Korman follows a logical progression in the Virginia Supreme
Court's complete abrogation of interspousal tort immunity.
84. "We are not concerned with the outmoded fiction that husband and wife are of 'one
flesh.' We are concerned, as we were in Keister, with a policy and with a rule of law that are
designed to protect and encourage the preservation of marriages." Korman v. Carpenter, 216
Va. 86, 90, 216 S.E.2d 195, 197 (1975).
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justification for the rule is the public policy of protecting family
harmony. Thus, whenever the equities appear to be on the side of
abrogation, the court often will allow the action," especially if the
action would not threaten to disrupt the family or if the loss ulti-
mately will fall on an insurer.
The case-by-case method of abrogating common law immunity
has its detractors. 6 In his dissent in Surratt, Justice Cochran stated
the bases upon which the upholding of immunity has been predi-
cated: decisions regarding immunity should be left to the legisla-
ture; adherence to the principle of stare decisis is a paramount
consideration; and prevention of fraud and collusion requires reten-
tion of the doctrine.87 In a separate dissent, Justice 1Iarman asserted
that judicial abrogation of a common law rule was in violation of
both the Virginia Constitution and Virginia statutory law.8" Despite
these thoughtful dissents, the case-by-case analysis of interspousal
torts continues.
PARENTAL IMMUNITY
The Origins of the Doctrine
Parental immunity from suit for personal torts is a uniquely
American doctrine. Unlike the basis for interspousal immunity,
however, no common law underpinning exists for parental immun-
ity for personal torts. 9 The common law did not recognize parental
immunity for several reasons. Although the marital relationship is
entered into by consent, the parent-child relationship is usually
85. For example, the high incidence of household liability insurance could well dictate a
decision that one spouse be allowed to sue the other for a negligent tort committed in the
home. The danger of fraudulent, collusive suits, enriching the family at the expense of the
insurer, counters this argument.
86. "As did the knights of yore, my Brothers of the majority sally forth across the draw-
bridge and on to the legislative plain, to strike another, yet nonfatal, blow at that terrible
dragon, the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity." 216 Va. at 92, 216 S.E.2d at
199 (Harman, J., dissenting).
87. 212 Va. at 195, 183 S.E.2d at 203 (Cochran, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 196, 183 S.E.2d at 203 (Harman, J., dissenting). For criticism of this trend away
from intrafamily immunities, see Casey, The Trend of Interspousal and Parental Immun-
ity-Cakewalk Liability, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 321 (1978).
89. McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REv. 521 (1960). The author
notes that "no case has been found prior to 1891, either in England or in the United States,




based upon blood."0 Thus, the act of marriage reasonably may re-
quire some loss of autonomy, while mere chance of birth should not
require a similar sacrifice; therefore, the common law judges re-
fused to deny a cause of action simply because of the accident of
birth.' Additionally, no identity of parent and child like that be-
tween husband and wife existed at common law. This distinction is
based in part on the difference in the nature of the relationships.2
Central to the parental relation is the rearing of the minor child;
when a child reaches majority, however, that relation loses its legal
significance. The marital relation is contractual in nature, and the
duties and disabilities assumed by each spouse attend through the
duration of the marital contract.
Accordingly, the child remained a separate legal person, entitled
to the benefits of his own property and the enforcement of his own
choses in action," both in tort and in property. 4 The parent's cus-
tody of the child did not alter this legal relation. Although the
common law in this area is sparse,95 the authorities indicate that the
common law did allow actions for personal torts between parent and
child."
No common law roots supported parental immunity; this doctrine
developed through case law. In 1891, the Mississippi Supreme Court
decided in the case of Hewellette v. George," an action for false
imprisonment, that no suit would be allowed between a parent and
a minor child for personal torts. Significantly, the Mississippi court
cited no authorities in support of this decision. The only rationale
offered was that allowing such an action would disturb domestic
harmony and interfere with parental controlf.9
Despite its lack of precedential support, the decision in
90. Adoption was unknown at common law. See Woodward's Appeal, 81 Conn. 152, 70 A.
453 (1908); Chehak v. Battles, 133 Iowa 107, 110 N.W. 330 (1907).
91. See W. McCuRDY, CASES ON DoMsTic RELATONS 791-807, 840-43, 862-88 (4th ed. 1952).
92. For a detailed analysis of the distinction between the relationship of husband and wife
and that of parent and child, see McCurdy, supra note 89, at 522-27.
93. See, e.g., Milton v. Middlesex R.R., 125 Mass. 130 (1878).
94. Apparently, a cause of action always was recognized in matters affecting property.
McKern v. Beck, 73 Ind. App. 92, 126 N.E. 641 (1920) (action by parent); Lamb v. Lamb,
146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895) (action by child).
95. See note 89 supra & accompanying text.
96. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971).
97. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
98. The court did not explain how domestic harmony could survive after one family mem-
ber had falsely imprisoned another.
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Hewellette became the general American rule." In 1903 it was ap-
plied by a Tennessee court in McKelvey v. McKelvey, °0 and two
years later in Roller v. Roller,101 a Washington court gave it further
credence. The doubtful nature of these opinions was evident be-
cause Hewellette was cited as stating a "well-settled rule" and
husband-wife cases were cited for support.0 2
The first case to challenge the holding was Dunlap v. Dunlap,"' ,
a 1930 case decided in New Hampshire. The court stated that
Hewellette had "establish[ed] a new rule of exceptional character
rather than enforc[ing] a rule already established."'' 4 The court
recognized the need to maintain parental authority, but questioned
the soundness of the rule, especially in the area of intentional inju-
ries inflicted by the parent.' 5
Support for the parental immunity rule has been grounded on a
variety of rationales: the protection of domestic tranquility and par-
ental authority; reluctance to deny other family members their
share of the family resources; and the desirability of preventing
fraudulent or collusive suits or those in which the parents will suc-
ceed to the judgment award.'10 Advocates of the rule have analog-
ized suits between parent and child to those between spouses and
even those against the state, in which immunity traditionally has
prevented the action. All of these rationales have been rigorously
criticized' 7 and only dogged adherence to stare decisis can account
for the continued vitality of the rule.'"'
99. For decisions following Hewellette, see McCurdy, supra note 89, at 528 nn.42-43.
100. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
101. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
102. Parent-child immunity was grouped with husband-wife immunity into a general fam-
ily disability to bring suit. This appears logical, considering the rationales of disruption of
family harmony and fear of collusive suits. Nonetheless, these policy reasons also apply to
suits between siblings and no immunity has been recognized in that context. See note 132
infra.
103. 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
104. Id. at - , 150 A. at 908 (citations omitted).
105. 84 N.H. at -, 150 A. at 909-10. For criticism of the parental immunity rule, see
McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1072-77; Sanford, supra note 27; Personal Torts Within the
Family, 9 VAD. L. REv. 823 (1956); 12 TULSA L.J. 545 (1976-77); 44 N.C. L. REv. 1169 (1966);
26 TENN. L. REv. 561 (1959). But see Cooperrider, Child v. Parent in Tort: A Case for the
Jury, 43 MINN. L. REv. 73 (1958).
106. 1964 Wis. L. REv. 714. This article discusses Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122
N.W.2d 193 (1963), the first decision in which the rule of parental immunity was completely
abrogated.
107. See note 105 supra.
108. See note 106 supra. Goller urged retention of the immunity when the alleged negligent
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Parental Immunity in Virginia
Virginia adopted the doctrine of parental immunity"9 in 1934 in
Norfolk Southern Railway v. Gretakis."0 In Gretakis, an infant
daughter was injured in a collision between a railroad car and an
automobile driven by her father. In an action between the daughter
and the railroad, the trial court determined that ninety percent of
the negligence was chargeable to the father and only ten percent to
the defendant railroad. After paying damages to the daughter, the
railroad company sought contribution from ,the father. The court
held that the railroad could not enforce contribution from the father
because the injured party was his child. Thus, the supreme court
placed the entire fiscal responsibility on a defendant responsible for
only ten percent of the negligence, applying the rule of parental
immunity to frustrate the purposes of the doctrine of contribution."'
The court was not influenced by the fact that the father was insured
fully, stating that the existence of liability insurance "does not cre-
ate any liability against the father, which would not exist were he
uninsured. '" 2
In seeking contribution from the father, the railroad company
relied upon the Virginia contribution statute."' The statute pro-
vided for a right of contribution only where the injured party had a
"right of action" against two persons for the same injury. In denying
the action, the court held that "[a]ccording to the great weight of
authority an unemancipated minor child cannot sue his or her par-
ent to recover for personal injuries resulting from an ordinary act of
act involves the exercise of parental authority or ordinary parental discretion with regard to
providing food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care.
109. Because no case recorded in Virginia involves an action by a parent against his child,
the rule is considered one of parental immunity.
110. 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934).
111. The defendant-father in Gretakis was covered fully by liability insurance. Thus, by
denying contribution to the railroad company, the court was not preventing depletion of the
family funds or disruption of the family harmony. The actual beneficiary of the immunity
was the insurer of the father, and the actual party absorbing the loss was the railroad com-
pany. The railroad company brought suit against the father; it is difficult to perceive, there-
fore, how the denial of the action in Gretakis could not serve the policy of preventing collusive
suits. Thus none of the three main policy factors supporting the immunity, prevention of
depletion of family funds, maintenance of family harmony, and prevention of collusive suits,
were at work in Gretakis.
112. 162 Va. at 600, 174 S.E. at 842 (citations omitted).
113. VA. CODE § 5779 (1919).
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negligence.""' Thus, because the injured daughter did not have a
cause of action against two persons for the same injury, no right of
contribution existed." 5 The court, however, distinguished its deci-
sion from situations in which the injured child is emancipated or
those in which a master-servant relationship exists between the
parent and child.
In 1939, the Virginia Supreme Court encountered its first direct
suit by an unemancipated child against a parent in Worrell v.
Worrell."I In Worrell, the plaintiff, a twenty-year-old college stu-
dent, was injured in a collision between a truck and a commercial
bus on which she was a passenger. The bus line was owned and
operated by her father, who paid her college expenses and provided
a home when she was not at school. Parental immunity became the
principal ground of defense. The court admitted that it could find
no English decisions under the common law forbidding a child to
sue his or her parent for a personal tort but listed the early cases
establishing the rule of parental immunity."7 The court pointed to
the parents' need to maintain authority and the desire to maintain
peace and tranquility within the family"8 as policy reasons for the
rule. Nonetheless, the court created an apparent exception to the
immunity by allowing the action to lie in the fact situation pre-
sented. The court emphasized that the daughter's being injured on
a bus owned by a parent was a very different situation from that in
which a minor child is injured in a family automobile driven by the
parent.
In Worrell, the court found that the action was brought against
the father in his capacity as the owner and operator of a common
*carrier. The court noted that the policy of the commonwealth was
to provide for the protection of the passengers of common carriers,
as evidenced by the Virginia statute requiring common carriers to
carry liability insurance. In this manner, the court reconciled
Worrell with Gretakis, in which no corresponding policy existed, as
evidenced by the lack of a statute requiring an individual motorist
114. 162 Va. at 600, 174 S.E. at 842 (citations omitted).
115. "The statute allowing contribution does not create any greater liability than existed
before its enactment." Id.
116. 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939).
117. Id. at 18-19, 4 S.E.2d at 346.
118. Id. at 19, 4 S.E.2d at 346.
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to carry liability insurance."'
The statute requiring all common carriers to carry liability insur-
ance was the critical factor in Worrell; therefore, the decision is
more an expression of public policy regarding common carriers than
support for an exception to parental immunity."" The real signifi-
cance of Worrell lies in its demonstration of the willingness of the
Virginia Supreme Court to weigh the policies behind the family
immunity doctrine against competing public policy considerations.
Additionally, the court's recognition of the difference in status be-
tween the husband-wife relation and that of parent and child' 2' as
well as the importance of the presence of liability insurance 22 were
significant aspects of the decision. Thus, although Worrell created
only a narrow exception to the general rule of parental immunity
established in Gretakis, it foreshadowed a change in the perspective
of Virginia courts regarding the family immunity doctrine.
Despite the move away from parental immunity augured by
Worrell, in 1953 the Virginia Supreme Court rejected an opportun-
ity to create another narrow exception to the rule. In Brumfield v.
Brumfield,'2 3 an infant daughter attempted to recover damages for
injuries sustained in an automobile accident in which her father was
the driver. The plaintiff had lived with her grandmother for several
years since the death of her mother, and during this time the father
had neither participated in the child's upbringing nor contributed
to her support. Nevertheless, the supreme court upheld the jury's
determination that the child was not emancipated, and therefore,
the suit could not be maintained. The court held that the question
of emancipation was for the jury' 24 and that the father's carrying
119. But see Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971). See text accompany-
ing notes 130-36 infra.
120. For the traditionally strict standards of care imposed upon common carriers, see W.
PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS § 34 (4th ed. 1971).
121. "The relation of husband and wife is created by law, that of parent and child by
nature." 174 Va. at 20, 4 S.E.2d at 346.
122. "This action is not unfriendly as between the daughter and the father." 174 Va. at
22, 4 S.E.2d at 347, quoting Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, -, 150 A. 905, 910 (1930).
Any action between child and parent in Gretakis would not have been "unfriendly" either,
because the father was fully covered by liability insurance. The distinction between the two
cases must have been the presence of the statute in Worrell, which the court felt expressed a
state policy of providing for the protection of all passengers of common carriers, regardless of
family relations.
123. 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953).
124. Id. at 580, 74 S.E.2d at 172.
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health insurance on the child and claiming her as a dependent for
income tax purposes supported the jury's finding of nonemancipa-
tion.12 Considering the serious consequences of total severance of
the family relation, the court stated that complete emancipation
"ought not lightly to be inferred."1 26
The decision in Brumfield demonstrates that, as of 1953, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court had little willingness to mitigate the harshness
of the parental immunity rule. The court in Brumfield cited
Gretakis as authority for denying the suit, stating that "the fact
that the father carried liability insurance created no liability or
cause of action where none otherwise existed.' '1 7 By applying a less
stringent definition of emancipation, 18 the court could have created
another narrow exception to the immunity rule and permitted the
action in that factual context. The court, however, did not employ
this alternative, and refused to express an opinion as to whether a
child could maintain an action against his or her parent for a willful
or malicious tort."9 Thus, the decision in Brumfield offered little
hope to those advocating a more flexible application of the parental
immunity doctrine.
Present Status of Parental Immunity in Virginia
Eighteen years after its unyielding decision in Brumfield, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court took a major step toward abrogation of tradi-
tional parental immunity. In Smith v. Kauffman,3 " the court al-
lowed a seven-year-old child to sue the administrator of her step-
father's estate for injuries suffered in an automobile accident alleg-
edly caused by the step-father's negligence.' 3' The trial court, rely-
ing on Gretakis, applied the defense of parental immunity, and
125. "Complete emancipation means the freeing of the child for all the period of its minor-
ity from the care, custody, control and service of its parents, conferring on the child the right
to its own earnings and terminating the parents' legal obligation to support it." Id. at 580-
81, 74 S.E.2d at 173.
126. Id. at 581, 74 S.E.2d at 173.
127. Id. at 583, 74 S.E.2d at 174.
128. See note 125 supra.
129. 194 Va. at 583, 74 S.E.2d at 174.
130. 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971).
131. The plaintiff failed to argue that the intrafamily tort immunity rule should be held
inapplicable because the stepfather had not adopted the plaintiff. The trial court found that
the defendant stood in loco parentis to the plaintiff and therefore was immune from suit. Id.
at 182, 183 S.E.2d at 191.
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dismissed the suit. The supreme court reversed, citing Midkiff v.
Midkiff,'3 2 a case in which the court had refused to extend family
immunity to suits between siblings. In Midkiff, the court had re-
jected policy arguments based on the danger of fraud and collusion
as grounds for maintaining immunity. The court noted in Kauff-
man that parental immunity in Virginia was "grounded solely on
the theory that a suit by a child against his parent 'tends to disturb
the peace and tranquility of the home, or disrupt the voluntary and
natural course of disposal of the parents' exchequer.' ",133
In Kauffman, the court recognized that the "high incidence" of
automobile liability insurance obviated the need to use the family
immunity doctrine in automobile accident litigation to protect fam-
ily harmony.' 34 Just as the court in Worrell had created an exception
to parental immunity on the basis of the Virginia statute providing
for compulsory insurance indemnity to passengers of common car-
riers, the court in Kauffman created an exception on the basis of the
Virginia Uninsured Motorist Act, which required liability insurance
to attach to each uninsured motor vehicle endorsement. 3 5 The court
quoted a New Jersey decision which had abrogated interspousal
immunity in automobile accident litigation: "'Domestic harmony
may be more threatened by denying a cause of action than by per-
mitting one where there is insurance coverage.' "136
132. 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960). In Midkiff, the court held that an unemancipated
infant may maintain a tort action against his unemancipated infant brother. In this question
of first impression in Virginia, the court followed the reasoning of other jurisdictions and thus
rejected the defendant's argument that the cases in Virginia prohibiting actions for personal
injuries between husband and wife and between parent and unemancipated child were applic-
able. See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y.
106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939). The court noted in Midkiff that "[plublic policy, predicted
disruption of domestic peace and amicable family relationships, and the possibility of collu-
sion and fraud provide no immunity to the tort-feasor in such cases." 201 Va. at 830, 113
S.E.2d at 876. Such reasoning appears equally sound when applied to husband-wife and
parent-child suits. Midkiff makes clear that the family immunity doctrine will not be ex-
tended beyond interspousal and child-parent relationships.
133. 212 Va. at 183, 183 S.E.2d at 192, quoting Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 19, 4 S.E.2d
343, 346 (1939).
134. "The very high incidence of liability insurance covering Virginia-based motor vehi-
cles, together with the mandatory uninsured motorist endorsements to insurance policies, has
made our rule of parental immunity anachronistic when applied to automobile accident
litigation." 212 Va. at 185, 183 S.E.2d at 194.
135. See id. at 184, 183 S.E.2d at 193.
136. Id. at 185, 183 S.E.2d at 194, quoting Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 489-90, 267 A.2d
481, 484-85 (1970).
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In abrogating the rule of parental immunity in actions by a child
against a parent to recover for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle
accident, the court in Kauffman cited other exceptions to the rule.
Brumfield, the court noted, stood for the proposition that an eman-
cipated child could maintain a personal injury action against his
parent. Gretakis established the principle that even an unemanci-
pated child could bring a personal injury action against his parent
if they stood in the relation of servant and master. Worrell was
recognized as the basis for the principle that an unemancipated
child can maintain an action against his or her parent for personal
injuries incurred while riding as a passenger on a common carier. 13
Thus, the effect of Kauffman was to render parental immunity a
valid defense only in suits by unemancipated infants against their
parents for intentionally inflicted or negligently caused injuries in
which the negligence does not involve automobiles.1 8 The excep-
tions appeared to swallow the rule.
Justices Harman and Cochran filed dissents in Kauffman, just as
they had in Surratt.'31 Justice Cochran characterized the majority
opinion as "an invasion of an area of responsibility more appropri-
ately entrusted to the legislature.""' He noted that parent-child
137. 212 Va. at 183, 183 S.E.2d at 192.
138. Perhaps the immunity retains vitality in these areas only by historical accident. The
court has not confronted either issue in recent years.
Kauffman is also noteworthy in establishing the rule that "a child under the age of fourteen
years is incapable of knowingly and voluntarily accepting an invitation to become a guest in
an automobile so as to subject himself to the gross negligence rule [of the Virginia automobile
guest statute]." Id. at 187, 183 S.E.2d at 195. The court was construing the Virginia automo-
bile guest statute, which required a showing of gross negligence before the passenger could
recover from the driver. VA. CODE § 8-646.1 (1957). Since the decision in Kauffman, the
Virginia General Assembly has amended its guest statute to eliminate the former provision
barring recovery against the host absent a showing of gross negligence. VA. CODE § 8.01-63.
The standard is now one of ordinary negligence. By amending the statute, Virginia has
avoided the problem of allowing spouses and children to sue within the family, while burden-
ing them with a showing of gross negligence. This amendment to the guest statute came after
the decisions in Surratt and Kauffman; therefore, the Virginia General Assembly did not
seem concerned with the problem of collusive suits. If the legislature had wanted to retard
the court's movement towards abrogation of the family immunities, it could have retained
the high standard of negligence required to be shown by the passenger before recovering from
the driver. Instead, the General Assembly seems to have codified the supreme court's philoso-
phy that the fear of fraudulent suits is not sufficient justification for eliminating a whole class
of litigants.
139. See text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
140. 212 Va. at 189, 183 S.E.2d at 196 (Cochran, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 189-90, 183 S.E.2d at 196-97 (Harman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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suits could lead to the destruction of the "moral fibre" of the child
by encouraging collusion and family disruption.'4 ' Similarly, Justice
Harman considered the majority's decision as "judicial legislation
in the sensitive area of the legal relationship between parent and
child.11 2 Harman decried the disruptive and inequitable effect that
the decision would have on insurers, whose rates were based on
existing legal responsibilities and duties.' The decision of the ma-
jority to limit application of the immunity rule but not to abolish
it signified to Harman that the court still upheld parental immunity
in certain situations. '44
Post-Kauffman Decisions in Virginia
Although Surratt and Kauffman placed Virginia in the main-
stream of legal thought by moving toward an abrogation of both
interspousal and parental immunities,1 5 the most recent decisions
of the supreme court have not fulfilled the promise of further abro-
gation of the immunities rules. In Wright v. Wright,4 ' decided one
year after Surratt and Kauffman, the court allowed the defense of
parental immuniy to defeat an action brought by a minor child.
Plaintiff brought an action against her father for injuries sustained
when the child fell in the family's backyard and was cut by a jagged
edge on a damaged metal awning. The girl's father, a general con-
tractor, maintained a storage shed for business purposes in his back-
yard, and the metal awning was part of his business equipment. The
141. Id. at 189, 183 S.E.2d at 196 (Cochran, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Obviously both collusion and family disruption will not be present in the same case. Either
the parent and child will collude to defraud the insurer, or they will be adversaries in the
suit. Only in the latter context is family disruption a concern.
142. Id. at 190, 183 S.E.2d at 197 (Harman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143. The majority's decision has "the effect of rewriting existing insurance contracts to
extend coverage for injury to persons not contemplated by the contracting parties when
coverage was written." Id. at 189, 183 S.E.2d at 196-97 (Harman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
144. The failure of my brethren of the majority to abrogate the rule in its entirety is
particularly significant. To me it indicates that they must be convinced that the
underlying reasons for the rule, namely, to avoid disruption of the peace and
tranquility of the home and to avoid disruption of the voluntary and natural
course of the parents' exchequer, are still valid.
Id. at 190, 183 S.E.2d at 197 (Harman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 88, in which the author criticizes the trend towards
abrogation of the family immunities. For a list of states which had fully or partially abrogated
the family immunities as of 1971, see United States v. Moore, 469 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1971).
146. 213 Va. 177, 191 S.E.2d 223 (1972).
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court denied the negligence action, citing Gretakis and distinguish-
ing Worrell by finding that the father's negligence was "only his
failure to discharge the normal parental duty of supervising and
providing a safe place for the child to play."'' 7 In so finding, the
court applied the general rule of parental immunity rather than the
business exception of Worrell."4 Had the court intended to endorse
further abrogation of the immunity doctrine it would have found
that the facts in Wright fell within the purview of the Worrell excep-
tion or that the exception itself should be broadened. In refusing to
adopt either of these approaches, the court limited the business
function exception to cases involving common carriers. "9 Thus, the
effect of Wright was to impede the movement toward total abroga-
tion of parental immunity in Virginia.
Another obstacle to the abrogation of parental immunity was pre-
sented by the 1976 case of Lyles v. Jackson. 50 Although the decision
ostensibly merely refused to give retroactive effect to the decision
in Kauffman,'5' the real significance of Lyles lies in the court's re-
fusal to allow an action by a child against his parent despite the
availability of a basis for an exception to the general rule. Lyles
involved a suit by four infant step-children against their former
step-father for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The
defendant had never adopted the step-children and the defendant
and the children's mother were divorced before the action was
commenced.'5 2 Therefore, Lyles provided an excellent opportunity
for a narrow exception to immunity as established in Korman v.
Carpenter. 5 3 Finding that the defendant stood in loco parentis to his
former step-children, the court relied instead on the general rule of
147. Id. at 179, 191 S.E.2d at 225.
148. "Thus the alleged negligence was incident to the parental relationship of the father
with his unemancipated child, and not to a business or vocational relationship." Id.
149. Perhaps the high incidence of business liability insurance in Virginia present in the
automobile liability insurance context of Kauffman explains the result in Wright. The plain-
tiff in Wright urged that her suit was not an unfriendly one and that she should be allowed
to recover because of the presence of liability insurance. The court rejected these arguments,
finding no indication of a state policy favoring actions such as the one brought by the plaintiff.
Id. at 179, 191 S.E.2d at 225. Thus the effect of Wright was to slow any trend toward total
abrogation of parental immunity in Virginia.
150. 216 Va. 797, 223 S.E.2d 873 (1976).
151. See note 77 supra.
152. Perhaps this suit was disallowed because the court feared that the divorce was ob-
tained out of a desire to avoid the rule of parental immunity.
153. See text accompanying notes 78-83 supra.
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parental immunity established in Gretakis and supported its deci-
sion with the traditional arguments for immunity. The court stated
that as the injury occurred before its decision in Kauffman, the
former rule of total parental immunity would be applicable, and
that this rule applied to "one standing in loco parentis.'"I4 Thus, in
a situation in which preservation of family harmony was impossible
and in which greater financial hardship would result from denying
the action than from permitting it, the court used a technicality to
support a finding of immunity.
Surratt and Kauffman appeared to signal Virginia's endorsement
of the national trend toward abrogation of the family immunities.
The more recent cases of Wright and Lyles, however, which refused
to create additional exceptions to the general rule of immunity,
demonstrate Virginia's resistance to abrogation. At the very least,
because of these two recent cases, the position a Virginia court will
take when faced with a suit between family members is impossible
to predict.
Virginia should adopt a firm, definable position on the family
immunity doctrine. The remainder of this Note will demonstrate
why a general rule of family immunity, even with exceptions, is no
longer a viable doctrine. Further, a proposal will be made for a
limited'family immunity approach and the adjustments necessary
to accommodate such a change in law will be-detailed.
THE UNTENABILITY OF A GENERAL RULE OF FAMILY IMMUNITY
Little support for the common law family immunities remains.' 5
The three policy factors cited most often in support of the immuni-
ties - preservation of family harmony, prevention of dissipation of
the family finances, and avoidance of collusive suits'5 ' - have been
criticized effectively.' 51 Courts have recognized that forbidding an
injured person to sue an offending family member is not a viable
approach to preserving family harmony.' 8 Not only may family har-
mony be impossible to preserve if the tort has been intentional or
154. 216 Va. at 799, 223 S.E.2d at 874.
155. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971).
156. See, e.g., Lyles v. Jackson, 216 Va. 797, 223 S.E.2d 873 (1976).
157. See note 105 supra.
158. "If [family harmony] were a valid sociological consideration, the Legislature could
orchestrate even greater harmony by abolishing the statute giving the right to divorce."
Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, - W. Va. -, -, 244 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1978).
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malicious, '59 but, as the court stated in Kauffman: "Domestic har-
mony may be more threatened by denying a cause of action than
by permitting one where there is insurance coverage."'"" The unrea-
sonability of maintaining family immunities in personal torts is
demonstrated further by the courts' traditional approval of actions
between family members for torts against property.'' If actions need
not be prevented in the interest of family harmony in a property
context, it is illogical to prohibit them merely because the tort is
against the person.
In many situations in which the family immunity doctrine has
been applied, the preservation of family harmony is not a plausible
justification. Often domestic tranquility has been disturbed before
the action is brought. Additionally, the real defendant in interest is
frequently the insurer and judgment against the defendant will not
result in any actual loss to the family defendant. Instead of support-
ing a general rule disallowing suits between family members, preser-
vation of family harmony is a more reasonable basis for a narrow
exception to a general rule which would permit such actions. By
using this limited immunity approach, courts would allow suits be-
tween family members unless the facts indicated a genuine threat
to family peace.
The second policy argument used to justify immunity, the danger
of depletion of family finances, is equally unpersuasive. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court has recognized the inapplicability of this argu-
ment in automobile accident litigation in which the real party in
interest is the insurer. 6 ' Most automobile owners carry liability in-
surance; therefore, family suits rarely result in the depletion of fam-
ily funds. Assuming no disturbance of the family unit has resulted,
suit will not be brought if the only result of such an action would
be to transfer funds from one family member to another. Thus,
whether the suit is brought merely to recover against an insurer or
to gain a judgment against a family member already divided from
the family unit, depletion of family funds will not result. In the first
159. "And if the domestic tranquility is to be disturbed, such is accomplished by the desire
to recover as fully as by recovery." Hamilton v. Fulkerson, - Mo. -' -, 285 S.W.2d
642, 647 (1955).
160. Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183, 183 S.W.2d 190, 194 (1971), quoting Immer v.
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 489-90, 267 A.2d 481, 484-85 (1970).
161. See, e.g., Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955).
162. See notes 68-76 supra.
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instance, the family will not sustain any loss from judgment, and
in the second, because the family is no longer intact, the individual
defendant's loss will not affect the family unit.
The third argument for preservation of the family immunities is
the fear that collusive suits between family members will result in
the defrauding of insurance carriers. Although this argument gener-
ally has been rejected as an insufficient justification for denying
actions btween family members," 3 the danger of defrauding insur-
ance carriers merits some attention. Nevertheless, the Virginia Su-
preme Court has stated: "If actions were barred because of the
possibility of fraud, many wrongs would be permitted to go without
redress."'' 4 Many commentators and jurists contend that the "fear
of collusion" argument insults the intelligence of jurors and judges
and that part of the judicial function involves distinguishing valid
claims from fraudulent ones. 5 In addition to these jurisprudential
objections some commentators have suggested that judicial or legis-
lative enforcement of family immunities may be a denial of equal
protection. 6 '
Total Abrogation: The New Jersey Approach
In its decisions in Kauffman and Surratt, which abrogated paren-
tal and interspousal immunities in automobile accident litigation,
the Virginia Supreme Court relied upon the reasoning of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Immer v. Risko. "I Additionally, in Surratt,
163. "Courts should not immunize tort-feasors because of the possibility of fraud or collu-
sion." Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 833, 113 S.E.2d 875, 878 (1960).
164. Id.
165. "We do an injustice not only to the intelligence of jurors, but to the efficacy of the
adversary system, when we express undue concern over the quantum of collusive or meritless
law suits." Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer,__ W. Va. _, __, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978).
166. See, e.g., Comment, Interspousal Tort Immunity: An Analysis of the Law in Washing-
ton and Oregon, 8 WumATTr L.J. 427 (1972). The commentator suggests that "a classifica-
tion of individuals on the basis of a marital status, the result of which is to deny members of
that group a right to a legal remedy for personal injuries, might well be denying them that
equal protection which the fourteenth amendment requires." Id. at 445, citing Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). If a court is dealing with a legislative enactment of family
immunity, however, it will defer to legislative judgment since marital status does not involve
a suspect category. Conceivably a plaintiff could construct an equal protection argument
based on marriage as a fundamental interest with which the courts and legislatures cannot
interfere without being subject to strict scrutiny. See McCurdy, supra note 9, at 322, which
suggests the danger of encouraging divorce when the potential recovery is large and the
negligent spouse is insured against liability.
167. 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970). See text accompanying note 73 supra. See also
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the Virginia court gave credence to State v. Culver,'5 another New
Jersey case in which the court had given its approval to approaching
the common law doctrine of family immunities with flexibility. "'
Because of its previous reliance on New Jersey decisions, Virginia
should follow the lead of the New Jersey court, which has now taken
the final step and, except in a few limited instances, eliminated the
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity.'70
In the 1978 case of Merenoff v. Merenoff,1 71 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that with certain exceptions "there presently exists
no cogent or logical reason why the doctrine of interspousal tort
immunity should be continued. 17 2 The court also noted that inter-
spousal immunity was no longer a majority position,'7 3 in fact, "if
any one dominant position can be said to have emerged from this
varigated experience, it is that expressed by a plurality of at least
twenty jurisdictions which have completely abrogated interspousal
immunity."'7 4 The New Jersey Supreme Court discredited the do-
mestic harmony rationale maintaining that: "Courts can claim no
penetrating insight by which to fathom the impact of an inter-
spousal law suit or gauge its effect upon the strength or fragility of
a marriage." '75
The court in Merenoff did not dismiss the "fear of collusion"
rationale without qualification, however. 7' In order to lessen the
chances of fraud, the court suggested fashioning a high standard of
care, adjusting the burden of proof, and even allowing the insurer
to enter the suit and treat the insured as a hostile witness. 7 7 Ad-
France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970) (abrogating parental
immunity in automobile accident litigation).
168. 23 N.J. 495, 505, 129 A.2d 715, 721 (1957).
169. "One of the great virtues of the common law is its dynamic nature that makes it
adaptable to the requirements of society at the time of its application in court." Id. at ,
129 A.2d at 721.
170. Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978) (the excepted areas are "best
left to be defined and developed on a case-by-case basis").
171. Id.
172. Id. at _, 388 A.2d at 962. Merenoff involved a household accident in which the
husband cut off his wife's index finger while trimming a hedge. The Merenoffs were covered
under a homeowner's policy which provided for personal liability coverage.
173. Id. at ., 388 A.2d at 954.
174. Id. at 388 A.2d at 955 (citations omitted).
175. Id. at , 388 A.2d at 959.
176. Id. at _, 388 A.2d at 961, citing Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 833, 113 S.E.2d
875, 878 (1960).
177. 176 N.J. at -, 388 A.2d at 961.
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dressing the danger of frivolous suits as a rationale for retaining
interspousal immunity, the court suggested that there is "a range
of activity arising in the case of a marriage relationship beyond the
reach of the law of torts."'7 8 The court included in this loosely de-
fined exception an area it called "domestic carelessness," a concept
to be elucidated by case-by-case consideration. Dismissing the final
traditional justifications for the immunities, the court rejected the
argument that civil damage actions between spouses were unneces-
sary because resort to the criminal and divorce courts would give
compensation to the victim of an interspousal tort. Thus, the effect
of Merenoff essentially was to abolish interspousal immunity in
New Jersey.179
This Note proposes that Virginia adopt the rule of Merenoff, be-
cause the pragmatic considerations which dictated the partial abro-
gation in both Immer and Surratt now require the total abrogation
announced in Merenoff. Virginia also should extend this abrogation
to parental immunity, because the policies supporting parental
immunity are essentially the same as those upon which interspousal
immunities are based and thus are similarly unpersuasive. In addi-
tion, Virginia should adopt the same exceptions of total abrogation
that were established in Merenoff. In so doing, Virginia would per-
mit the' defense of family immunity in cases involving "domestic
carelessness" and other areas of family activity in which judicial
involvement would be inappropriate. As suggested in Merenoff, the
scope of these exceptions must be developed on a case-by-case basis.
Virginia should permit suits between family members unless the
suit would pose a genuine threat to the preservation of family unity.
Such a position would be consistent with the traditional tort maxim
that every injury should be remedied, while maintaining the respect
and hands-off attitude that has characterized the American judici-
ary's reluctance to intrude into the family unit.
178. Id. at _ 388 A.2d at 961. "Special matters of privacy and familiarity may be
encompassed by a marital or nuptial privilege and fall outside the bounds of a definable and
enforceable duty of care." Id.
179. Contra, Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963). This decision
reinstated the immunity which had earlier been abrogated in the case of Taylor v. Patten, 2
Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954).
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MAINTENANCE OF ABROGATION OF FAMILY IMMUNITIES AGAINST
INSURER'S EXCLUSION CLAUSES
If Virginia abrogates family immunities as suggested, it is likely
that insurance lobbyists will urge that the State Corporation Com-
mission adopt family exclusion clauses in liability insurance con-
tracts.' 0 Abrogation of the doctrine by the courts and acquiescence
by the General Assembly would indicate a state policy favoring
compensation for personal torts between family members; therefore,
attempts by insurers to exclude such recoveries must be deemed
contrary to public policy.'' Thus, to implement the policy of allow-
ing suits between family members, insurance carriers must be pre-
vented from excluding family members from liability coverage.' 2
An increase in insurance rates is a foreseeable consequence of
abrogating the family immunities. Raising premiums will serve to
distribute to subscribers the losses sustained by insurance compa-
nies in newly allowed suits between family members. This sharing
of loss is a more desirable result than excluding a whole class of
injury victims merely because they were injured by one in a family
relation.'1 Such a shifting and diluting of loss actually comports
with basic insurance principles.
180. For a typical family or household exclusion clause, see Casey, supra note 88, at 331.
181. 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 167 (1972). The author argues that if family exclusion clauses were
allowed in Virginia, the right to sue would be offset by the insurer's option to exclude.
182. Virginia must construe VA. CODE § 38.1-381 (Cum. Supp. 1978) so as to prohibit the
family exclusion clause. This statute reads in pertinent part:
(al) Nor shall any such policy or contract ... be so issued or delivered unless
it contains an endorsement or provision insuring the named insured, against
liability . . . as a result of negligence ....
(a2) Any endorsement, provision or rider attached to, or included in, any such
policy of insurance which purports or seeks in any way to limit or reduce in any
respect the coverage afforded by the provisions required therein by this section
shall be wholly void.
Id.
See Southside Distrib. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 213 Va. 38, 189 S.E.2d 681 (1972)
(holding void a provision in a liability policy that coverage did not extend to an employee of
the insured). Accord, United States v. Government Emp. Ins. Co., Inc., 409 F. Supp. 986
(E.D. Va. 1976). But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Leary, 168 Mont. 482, 544 P.2d
444 (1975) (holding that family exclusion clauses are not against public policy; however, this
may be based on the fact that Montana has not yet abrogated the family immunities).
183. See James & Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 431 (1950); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of
Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
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Direct Action Against the Insurance Carrier
Direct action against the insurance carrier was suggested by a
concurring opinion in Lee v. Comer,'s8 a West Virginia decision ab-
rogating parental immunity. The court advocated abrogation only
in those situations where the real party in interest is an insurance
carrier.'85 In so deciding, the court recognized that one strong impe-
tus to abrogation is the presence of insurance.'88 This acknowledg-
ment was a departure from the traditional reluctance of courts to
allow insurance to create liability where otherwise none would exist.
Justice Neely, concurring in Lee, stated that insurers should not
be "handicapped in their defense by the continuing myth that in-
surance has no effect upon the rules of procedure, a rule originally
made for the [insurers'] benefit."'8 7 He advocated creating "logical
procedures" to deal with the "minimum cooperation" of the insured
and to protect the interests of the insurer. In intrafamily litigation,
one "logical procedure" would give the insurer "the option of de-
fending the suit either in the name of the insured or in its own name
as the real party in interest."'8 8 In addition, the insurer need not be
bound by any statement of the insured. Adoption of this proposal
would enable the insurer to combat the dangers of collusion and lack
of cooperation by the insured. Courts could offer the insurer further
protection by allowing the mention of insurance during the course
of the trial. Upon request, the insurer would be permitted to tell the
jury that the insurer is the real adverse party, and that the insured
184. - W. Va. -, -, 224 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1976) (Neely, J., concurring).
185. For a similar view, see Ashdown, Intrafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the
Family Exclusion Clause, 60 IowA L. REv. 239 (1974). The author suggests that the lack of
insurance coverage merely causes "a reallocation of family assets to provide for the injured
family member with no actual depletion of family funds." Id. at 248. Additionally, abrogation
of family immunities may be the "judicial creation of a limited no-fault compensation sys-
tem." Id. at 251.
186. "If the Court implicitly recognizes that the operative fact which mandates a rule with
regard to automobiles different from the rule in other situations is the existence of insurance,
then the Court should say so and proceed to develop logical procedures to protect all con-
cerned." - W. Va. at _, 224 S.E.2d at 725-26 (Neely, J., concurring).
187. Id. at -, 224 S.E.2d at 726 (Neely, J., concurring).
188. Id. at -, 224 S.E.2d at 726 (Neely, J., concurring). But see Casey, supra note 88,
at 331. The author applauds Justice Neely's position, but expresses some reservations:
"To candidly express to the jury in effect that the issue is really insurance destroys the last
vestige of uncertainty that might exist as to who is going to pay any award granted." Id.
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and the injured party have a common interest."' Although Virginia
adheres to the rule that insurance should not be mentioned during
trial, ' the rule is deemed to operate for the benefit of the insurer
and can be waived."'9 The courts of Virginia should continue to allow
the insurer to waive this rule and should recognize this waiver as a
legitimate trial tactic.
A third method for establishing procedures to deal with the inter-
ests of the insurer in intrafamily tort litigation involves the use of
"an instruction that testimony by the insured with regard to the
circumstances surrounding the accident should be received with
great caution."'' 2 The concurring opinion in Lee suggests "an in-
struction similar to the one mandated in criminal cases with regard
to the uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator."'9 3 Virginia
should adopt such a rule and even allow the insurer to treat the
insured as a hostile witness.' This procedure would mitigate the
dangers of fraud and collusion among family members in a tort
action.
Adoption of Justice Neely's suggestions would constitute the best
approach to intrafamily tort litigation, and would safeguard the
adversary nature of the judicial process. Juries frequently are aware
that a defendant carries liability insurance; therefore, acknowledg-
ment of such coverage will have only minimal impact on their con-
sideration of a case.' 5 The insurer should be allowed the option of
taking the steps necessary to present an effective defense to an
189. - W. Va. at _.-- 224 S.E.2d at 726 (Neely, J., concurring).
190. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lobello, 212 Va. 534, 535, 186 S.E.2d 80, 82 (1972) (the mention
of insurance at trial can constitute reversible error); Hope Windows, Inc. v. Snyder, 208 Va.
489, 493, 158 S.E.2d 722, 725 (1968). The rule is based on the belief that the mention of
insurance "tends to unduly influence the jury in behalf of the plaintiff." Highway Express
Lines, Inc. v. Fleming, 185 Va. 666, 672, 40 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1946). The rule, however, is not
rigidly applied. The "mention of insurance may not be reversible error where there is an
otherwise fair trial and substantial justice is done." Willard v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 213
Va. 481, 483, 193 S.E.2d 776, 778 (1973), citing Simmons v. Boyd, 199 Va. 806, 812, 102 S.E.2d
292, 296 (1958).
191. See, e.g., Willard v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 213 Va. 481, 483, 193 S.E.2d 776, 778
(1973).
192. _ W. Va. at - , 224 S.E.2d at 726 (Neely, J., concurring).
193. Id., citing State v. Spadafore, - W. Va. -, 220 S.E.2d 655 (1975).
194. See 13 DuQ. L. REv. 156 (1974).
195. When the husband and wife or parent and child are seen leaving the courtroom hand-
in-hand, there will be little uncertainty left as to who is going to pay any judgment.
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action in damages which might result in a finding of liability which
it will have to pay. 9'
CONCLUSION
Virginia should abrogate its family immunities in all areas of tort
liability except those within a narrowly defined zone of family activ-
ity. In the area of "domestic carelessness," the desirability of allow-
ing actions against family members must give way to the preserva-
tion of family harmony. Additionally, the Virginia State Corpora-
tion Commission should prevent insurance companies from circum-
196. One consequence of the abrogation of any immunity is the conflict of laws problem
that arises when a party domiciled in a state that has abrogated the immunity is injured in
a state that has maintained the immunity, or vice versa. The Virginia Supreme Court re-
cently reaffirmed its adherence to traditional choice of law rules in a case involving the
application of interspousal immunity. In McMillan v. McMillan, - Va. , 253 S.E.2d
662 (1979), the court applied Tennessee law, which does not allow interspousal tort suits, in
an action brought by a passenger-wife against her driver-husband for an automobile accident
occurring in Tennessee, despite the fact that the couple was domiciled in Virginia. This
represented an application of the traditional principle of the lex loci delicti, or "place of the
wrong" rule.
Despite acknowledgment of the increasing number of jurisdictions applying a "most signifi-
cant relationship" test in similar actions, Virginia's highest court opted for the "uniformity,
predictability, and ease of application of the Virginia rule." - Va. at ., 253 S.E.2d at
664. For a statement of the "most significant relationship" test, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 169 (1971). This test, to determine which state's law shall govern
the substantive rights of the parties in an interstate tort suit, considers such factors as the
place where the injury occurred, the domicile of the parties, and the place where any relation-
ship between the parties is centered. Virginia should adopt such a framework of analysis, as
a rule of lex domicilii is more consonant with the expressed state policy of allowing recovery
in interspousal suits involving personal injuries sustained in automobile accidents. The rule
stated in McMillan denies compensation to a Virginia resident because of the chance occurr-
ence of his injury in a state that maintains total interspousal immunity. This was not the
intended result of Virginia's partial abrogation of the family immunities.
The Virginia Supreme Court's reluctance to effect wholesale changes in its choice of law
rules is understandable; therefore, the Virginia General Assembly should establish the needed
consistency between Virginia's choice of law rules and the policy of allowing intrafamily suits
in some instances. Thus, the legislature should adopt a statute similar to North Carolina
General Statute § 52-5.1 which states:
A husband and wife shall have a cause of action against each other to recover
damages for personal injury, property damage or wrongful death arising out of
acts occurring outside of North Carolina, and such action may be brought in this
State when both were domiciled in North Carolina at the time of such acts.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5.1, construed in Henry v. Henry, 291 N.C. 156, 229 S.E.2d 158 (1976).
Such a narrowly drawn statute, confined to tort actions that the legislature deems allowable
between family members, would be an appropriate means by which to recognize the fact that
the state where the family is domiciled normally has the greatest interest in establishing
policies affecting the familial relationship.
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venting the effects of abrogation by denying carriers the opportunity
to insert family exclusion clauses in the standard liability contract.
Because the insurance company is the real party in interest, insur-
ance companies should be permitted the option of defending di-
rectly all suits between members of the same family. Similarly,
mention at trial of the existence of insurance coverage should be
allowed.
The doctrines of interspousal and parental immunity were based
initially on procedural disabilities based on conceptions peculiar to
the era of their inception. As the persuasiveness of common law
rationales declined, public policy considerations supplanted them.
Today these policy rationales also have lost their credibility and the
doctrine of family immunities retains vitality only because the law
changes slowly. Virginia has taken a step-by-step approach to abol-
ishing the traditional rules of family immunity, carefully limiting
the effect of each decision to the particular facts of each case. More
recently, the Virginia Supreme Court has manifested an unwilling-
ness to continue the abrogation process despite the popularity of
this position throughout the country. Virginia now should abolish
the family immunity doctrine, except in those limited situations in
which prohibition of the action might preserve family harmony.
Effective jurisprudence and public policy demand no less.
EvANs L. KING, JR.
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